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ABSTRACT
Union membership decline has p rompted theoretical and empirical discussions of how high levels 
of union membership can be facilitated. I t  is analysed how – amongst a variety of factors –
industry-wide, multi-employer bargaining is constrained or supported by legislative intervention and 
whether this ameliorates the tension between inclusive bargaining, perceived benefits of union 
membership and ‘free-riding’. The paper’s review of recent Danish and New Zealand t rends 
indicate that it is very difficult to overcome the latent propensity to ‘free-ride’. Despite a relatively 
high union density level, Danish unions are concerned about recent changes to the unemployment 
insurance system and the growth in ‘discount unionism ’ and New Zealand unions are faced with 
unanticipated outcomes where government policies and legislation supportive of collectivism has 
coincided with a fall in private sector union density. In the current economic, social and institutional 
context, considerable state support of a direct and/or indirect nature may be necessary to reverse 
recent declines in union membership. 
INTRODUCTION
The starting point of this paper are recent theoretical and empirical discussions of declining union 
membership trends in OECD countries and which factors can facilitate higher levels of union 
membership. In particular, the paper draws on recent Danish and New Zealand issues and trends 
as it highlights the role of the state to influence trade union interest representation. As argued in 
the paper, there have been considerable changes in the institutional and legislative context of 
unionism in many OECD countries which have influenced unionism and collective bargaining. 
While the legislative context can be crucial in facilitating collective bargaining representation, the 
paper analyses specifically how industry-wi de, multi-employer bargaining can be facilitated or 
constrained through legislative intervention and if there are other ways of strengthening collective 
bargaining. Generally, industry-wide, multi-employer bargaining is a cost-efficient way of delivering 
goods and services to union members but it cuts across the recent rise in workplace bargaining –
both as single employer bargaining and decentralised elements of nation-wide collective 
agreements. 
This is of special relevance in countries without the existence of erga omnes clauses, such as 
Denmark and New Zealand. Besides being cost-efficient, multi-employer bargaining also allows 
unions to influence industry-wide concerns – for example, skill development, occupational health 
and safety, turnover and retention – and this may entice employers and non-union workers to 
engage with unions. However, effective multi-employer bargaining is only a necessary but not 
sufficient pre-condition as union membership ‘choices’ are complex and influenced by many 
factors. At the most basic level, employees must perceive (in normative and/or instrumental term s) 
that union membership is relevant to them. This implies that the latent propensity of employees to 
‘free-ride’ can be overcome which is very difficult in a political environment where compulsory
union membership or ‘closed shop’ arrangements are frowned upon. 
In light of this discussion of union membership ‘choices’, our two country overviews focuses on the 
exi stence of multi-employer bargaining, the perceived benefits of union membership and ‘free-
riding. issues. It is explained why there have difficulties in revitalising trade unions in New Zealand
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in new millennium, despite a legislative framework which explicitly promotes unionism and 
collective bargaining (Rasmussen 2009). It also indicates why the Danish trade unions are worried, 
despite a high level of union density and the lack of an openly trade union hostile government. A 
recent decline in union density indicates the crumbling effectiveness of the unemployment 
insurance system as a ‘recruitment machine’ for the trade unions (Lind 2004) and leaves the 
Danish unions in a position where they have to look for other imperatives for union membership.
TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP: THEORETICAL ‘CHOICES’ AND EXPLANATIONS
Vi sser (2002: 406-407) suggests that trade unions may lose members for “two main reasons (a) 
they do not deliver the goods and services that workers expect; and (b) they are unable to uphold 
the norm or social custom, which, in the absence of coercion, assures that a sufficient number of 
workers share the cost of producing these goods and services.” While this may sound like a 
plausible and simple explanation, it hardly does justice to the theoretical and empirical complexity 
surrounding union membership choices and the recent attempts to reverse the decline in union 
density in a number of OECD countries. Likewise, many theoretical discussions of union 
membership have often pointed to three primary explanations for union membership –
instrumental, utilitarian and ideological reasons (Wheeler and McClenden 1991). In that sense, 
becoming a trade union member i s often portrayed as a distinct ‘choice ’ between seeking 
immediate improvements of the employment situation, being based upon economic rationality or 
some sort of normative reason.
The tension between inclusive bargaining and ‘free-riding’ has been a major union concern and 
highlights the difficulties associated with Visser’s notion of ‘sharing the costs of union services’. In 
fact, the classical notion that ‘free-riding’ is a rational economic choice (see Crouch 1982, Olson
1980) has recently been reiterated forcefully by Friedman (2008: 24): “Individual workers can 
always do better for them selves, they can get more money and better jobs for themselves, by free 
riding than supporting the collective process.”  So, to attract members the unions must, according 
to Friedman (2008: 59), “persuade workers to ignore their own narrow financial interest to 
contribute to a collective project where success or failure depends on the actions of others.”
Although it is unclear how much the collectivist orientation has changed in recent decades – as 
Waddington and Whitson shows, individual benefits and services have certainly not become the 
main reason for joining unions (Waddington and Whitston 1997) – it is difficult to ‘persuade’ 
workers to apply a collectivist attitude. But it is plausible that some conditions provide a necessary 
condition for such a process. Among these, industry-wide, multi-employer bargaining, non-
contested workplace presence and inclusive bargaining are some obvious factors (Visser 1991) 
because they strengthen the union presence, visibility and influence at workplaces. The remaining 
obstacle is, however, the problem of ‘free riding’.
This problem of ‘free riding’ can be solved if collective bargaining gains were exclusive to union 
members. If union membership gave some clear benefits it would be more attractive for non-union 
members to join. This could, for example, be solved by means of closed shop arrangements or 
other sorts of compulsory membership rules. These means have previous been used in Denmark 
and New  Zealand but in the current context of ‘free collective bargaining’ closed shops and other 
compulsory arrangements are against the rules.
It appears necessary that the state provide more favourable conditions for unions to recruit 
members. In most countries trade union membership rates peaked between 1975 and 1985 
(France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, UK), while unions in other countries were doing well until
the mid-1990s (Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden) where they also started to lose 
members (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000, Ei ronline 2004). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, unions 
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searched for new patterns of attracting members by introducing new services and finding new 
strategies, but the loss of members has continued in almost all countries.
Table 1. Trade union membership in New Zealand and Denmark
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Den mark
Members 1 746 1 756 1 763 1 749 1 816 1 820 1 824 1 786 1 760 1 745
Employees 2 365 2 330 2 326 2 257 2 347 2 410 2 457 2 443 2 454 2 514
Membership rate 74 75 76 77 77 76 74 73 72 69
New Zealand
Members 659 603 428 376 339 307 319 335 354 383
Employees 1 278 1 235 1 196 1 276 1 382 1 393 1 428 1 538 1 629 1 741
Membership rate 52 49 36 29 25 22 22 22 22 22
Source: OECD.Stat
While the union membership trends in Denmark and New Zealand illustrate some of the 
membership pressures found in other OECD countries they have clearl y ploughed their own path. 
In particular, the high union density levels found in Denmark and the reversal in the legislative
position of collective bargaining and unionism in New Zealand since 2000 indicate the uniqueness 
of issues and trends associated with collective bargaining and unionism in the two countries. This 
uniqueness becomes more obvious in our abbreviated overview of recent bargaining and 
membership changes in the two countries. 
AN OVERVIEW OF DANISH AND NEW ZEALAND ISSUES AND TRENDS
Danish unions: high union density under pressure
Traditionally, Danish trade unions have had a good record  in recruiting members as the regulation 
of the labour market has been built upon voluntarism (limited state intervention) and a 
comprehensive web of industry-wide, multi-employer collective agreements. This provides the 
foundation of the so-called ‘Danish model’ (Due et al. 1994). Ever since the first comprehensive 
employer-union agreement in 1899, the state has been pursuing a laissez faire strategy towards
collective bargaining parties.  In addition, employers’ organisations and trade unions have been part 
of tripartite processes since the 1950s which have provided them with a high level of influence on 
labour market legislation (Lind 1991, 2007). Currently, the unions have strong representation in 
most industrial sectors and a high level of legitimacy vis-a-vis the state and in the wider society.
Collective bargaining is almost entirely based upon industry-wide, multi employer agreements,
covering around 60 per cent of the private sector (around 75 per cent of the entire labour market). 
Since the early 1990s, company level negotiations (local agreements) have been setting pay 
level s,  working hours and some other employment conditions within the limits specified by national
agreements. With a recent (2007) banning of all ‘closed shops’ (which were very few), the system 
has become very open for ‘free riding’. This is a new situation as for many years union
membership rates have been increasing and stayed above 80 per cent. As many unions members 
are covered  by collective agreements (around 25 per cent of the members of the LO-affiliated 
unions - LO 2000) there have been some attempts by unions to introduce exclusive bargaining in 
2007, but they have been rejected by the employers’ organisations as well as the Government.
The attempts to introduce exclusive bargaining show that there is considerable concern about 
‘free-riding’ and this has been fuelled  by a decline in union density. Until the mid-1990s, t rade 
union membership rates were still increasing, but since then they have been declining for some 
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important unions within the LO (LO - the Federation of Danish Unions). The other two main peak 
organisations, the FTF (civil servants) and the AC (academics) have been gaining members and in 
recent years, trade unions outside the main organisations have al so recorded a significant increase 
in members.
A main reason for the LO loss of members is simply occupational change: relatively fewer people 
are skilled trades people or unskilled workers and instead a growing part of the workforce has
received higher education and work in professional jobs. T his has resulted in a shift from LO-
affiliated unions in favour of the FTF and AC unions getting more members. Another reason is that 
more employees have become members of unions outside the three main organisations. Most 
important is the Christian Trade Union which has existed many years in opposition to the more 
aggressive trade unionism of the LO. Recently, unions from the so-called Trade Union House have 
had many new members. These unions have marketed themselves as service providers and
without the traditional trade union behaviour and functions (like signing collective agreements). 
The membership losse s to the ‘discount-unions’ are considered to be seriously undermining
traditional trade unionism. The easy explanation of the ‘discount unions’ success i s that 
membership fees in these unions are much lower compared to other unions, though this is 
probably not the whole story. Some trade union leaders have ascribed recent membership losses
to the banning of closed shops following a ruling of the European Court in January 2006. This has 
certainly had an effect. Maybe not directly as very few workplaces were covered by a closed shop 
agreement. But indirectly as the ruling from the European Court has made it more obvious to many 
workers that it is their own choice whether to join a union and, if so, which union they want to join. 
The other, and perhaps more important, reason for declining union density has been the changes 
in the unemployment insurance system. As in Sweden and Finland, the unemployment insurance 
in Denmark is a so-called Ghent system: unemployment insurance is voluntary and based upon 
membership of unemployment funds. These funds were originally set up by the trade unions and 
they are still affiliated or associated with trade unions. To a large extent, this unemployment 
insurance system has functioned as a de facto recruitment machinery for the trade unions (Lind 
2004, Böckerman and Uusitalo 2006, Kjellberg 2006), and unlike unions in most other countries, 
the unions in the Ghent-countries tend to benefit from rising unemployment – and tend to lose 
members at times of lowering unemployment. The latter has taken place since the mid-1990s in all 
three countries (in Denmark unemployment peaked at 12 per cent in 1994 and was down to 2 per 
cent in 2008), so the declining unemployment rates is also a reason for membership loses.
In addition, the unemployment insurance has been made less attractive to the unemployed: the 
unemployment benefit compensation rate (compared to former wages) have been reduced by 
around 25 per cent since the early 1980s, while stricter availability tests, limitation of the access to 
membership of unemployment funds, shorter periods of entitlements, disciplining activation 
schemes are amongst the measures making it less attractive to take up unemployment insurance 
(Møller et al 2008). On the top of this, the Government made it possible from 2002 onwards for 
unemployment funds to accept members from a variety of backgrounds where the funds previously 
had been aligned with certain industries or occupations. The membership of these so-called trade 
union independent funds has recorded a major upturn. From 2002 to 2008, the LO-affiliated funds 
lost 19.0 per cent o f their members while the unemployment funds affiliated to unions outside the 
main organisations gained 15.4 per cent. The absolute frontrunner in this change has been the 
inter-trade unemployment fund, Danish Wage Earners (Danske Lønmodtagere), which was 
established in 2002 as a result of the new legislation. From having no members in 2002, it had 
over 60,000 members in 2008, and increased its membership by 34 per cent during 2006-2008.
A crucial question i s what will happen as the current economic crisis liftsunemployment rates. Will 
workers join unemployment funds again and will they join the trade union affiliated funds or the 
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alternatives, the independent and inter-trade funds? The first impression, based on the effect of
increasing unemployment figures in early 2009, i s that this does not augur well for the unions. 
While it seems like workers are now joining the unemployment funds again after 15 years of strong 
employment growth has ended, they are not joining the LO-affiliated funds, but the independent 
ones (Arbejdsdirektoratet 2009a and 2009b). If this becomes the general trend then the 2002 
legislation would have had its intended effect: to make the unemployment insurance system less 
efficient as a trade union membership recruitment machinery. 
Supporting union membership growth in New Zealand: unanticipated outcomes
The historical trends surrounding collective bargaining and unionism in New Zealand indicate that it 
is difficult – outside the public sector – to sustain high levels of collective bargaining and union 
density in a country characterised by small and medium-si zed workplaces which are 
geographically dispersed. Normally, the history of New Zealand employment relations can be 
divided into 4 major phases: prior to the legislative reforms of 1894, the conciliation and arbitration 
system (1894-1990), the ‘free-market system’ under the Employment Contracts Act in the 1990s, 
and the legislative and political support of collective bargaining and unionism under the 
Employment Relations Act in the new millennium.
As the conciliation and arbitration system (1894-1990) mainly provides a historical background, it 
suffices to say that this system provide a legislative and institutional backing for unionism which 
made it easy for even weak unions to provide tangible benefits for their members (Rasmussen 
2009). As these benefits were predominantly provided through the conciliation and arbitration 
system – though direct collective bargaining could enhance the minimum pay and conditions 
stipulated through awards – unions tended to become dependent on the institutional support 
(‘creatures of the state’). As these benefits were generally available through ‘blanket coverage’ 
(equivalent to erges o mnes clauses) on an occupational and industry basis, there was always the 
issue of how to limit benefits to union members only. This was either dealt with through ‘closed 
shop’ arrangements and, in certain period, through compulsory union membership in designated 
jobs, occupations and/or industries being enshrined in legislation. 
This changed with the Employment Contracts Act 1991 which abolished the award system and
union registration and curtailed union workplace access (Harbridge 1993). There were few 
prescriptions for bargaining behaviour and unions were relegated to being ‘bargaining agents’. This 
facilitated a shift towards individual and workplace bargaining. Legislation also covered all 
employees, whether on collective or individual employment contracts and all employees were 
covered by statutory minima, including a personal grievance right which allowed individualised 
access to employment institutions. This reduced the benefit of being a union member and unions 
faced a more contested ‘market’ with a strong growth in private sector advisors, consultants and 
legal specialists. Although the characteristics of the new employment relations system aligned 
more closely with the Danish employment relations system (see Table 1 in Rasmussen and Lind, 
2000), it was with unions accustomed to extensive state support, limited experience of workplace 
bargaining and with few resources to service and negotiate for their members. This prompted a 
sharp reduction in union density in the early 1990s, as can be seen from Table 1 above.
In 2000, a new centre-left government introduced the Employment Relations Act, which supported 
explicitly collective bargaining and unionism within a ‘social democratic’ approach to economic 
policy, social welfare, and infrastructure and capability development (Rasm ussen 2004). Besides 
stipulating better workplace access for unions and re-introducing strike rights in association with 
multi-employer bargaining, it restrained union avoidance behaviour by employers through giving 
unions the ownership of collective employment agreements and by prescribing acceptable 
bargaining behaviour through the new notion of ‘good faith’. An Amendment Act in 2004 also 
attempted to constrain the employers’ ability to ‘pass on’ union-negotiated improvements to term s 
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and conditions (Rasmussen 2009). As can be seen from Table 1, overall union density has 
stopped falling but it has hardly increased in the new millennium. Furthermore, the overall figures 
hide that there has been a decline in union density in the private sector where union density has 
dropped to around 9 percent in 2008.
It is relatively easy to explain the high level of collective bargaining coverage and union density 
under the conciliation and arbitration system and the rapid decline under the Employment 
Contracts Act. However, it is more difficult to explain why collective bargaining and union 
membership has languished under the Employment Relations Act. Research has pointed to the 
following explanatory factors (Rasmussen 2009: 129):
 Prevalence of small and medium-sized workplaces
 Employer resistance or lack of support
 Employee apathy or lack of interest
 Unions’ inability to foster more multi-employer bargaining
The prevalence of small and medium -si zed workplaces creates a major organising problem for the 
unions and this can normally only be overcome through comprehensive multi-employer bargaining 
arrangements but unions have not been able to progress such arrangements. A major barrier has 
been the employers’ lack of interest in collective bargaining (see Foster et al. 2009) and there have
been several instances of open opposition to multi-employer bargaining. Surprisingly, surveys have 
found that employees are relatively positive about direct, individualised employer-employee 
bargaining. This has coincided with the ‘market’ and the government both providing significant 
benefits to workers. There has been a tight labour market with employment opportunities and 
above-inflation pay rises and the government has enhanced significantly statutory minima (as well 
as social welfare improvements). The unions have highlighted the importance of ‘free-riding’ where 
collective bargaining is undermined as employers ‘pass on’ union-negotiated improvements and 
thi s has prompted public policy changes. These changes appear to have had limited or no effect. 
In short, private sector unions are faced with a situation where they have not been able to: institute 
effective multi-employer bargaining to overcome the prevalence of small and medium -si ze 
enterprise, ‘persuade’ employers that collective bargaining is relevant or unavoidable, show 
employees that collective bargaining and union membership are a positive option. These trends
rai se several questions. Should the unions pushed for stronger and/or different legislative changes 
in support of collectivism? Was it possible for unions to pursue multi-employer bargaining more 
effectively? Could unions have developed a more effective curtailing of ‘free-riding’? Has the union 
support of improved statutory minima been counterproductive by making union membership less 
attractive? Overall, the unions have been faced with a supportive government and legislative 
framework and there have been many positive employment trends. However, collective bargaining 
and unions are probably as weak now as they were at the turn of century and the key issues about 
‘free-riding’, multi-employer bargaining and union-specific benefits have not been tackled. This 
could be fatal as a centre-right government elected in late 2008 have plans to downgrade the 
status of unions and make non-union collective agreements legal. 
   
Discussion: Danish and New Zealand issues and trends
The two cases, Denmark and New Zealand, reveal very different stories about trade union 
membership developments and how their governments have reacted. The truncated overview has 
bypassed many relevant factors and instead has focused on the role of efficient delivery of gains in 
employment conditions through multi-employer bargaining and the tension between inclusive 
bargaining and ‘free-riding’. As indicated, the actions by various governments have influenced 
union density levels, though not always in the anticipated way and/or with the anticipated strength.
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The strong position of Danish unions has been built on the historical strength of multi-employer 
bargaining which goes back to the establishment of a voluntarist system in 1899. Although the 
current ‘Danish model’ has become more legislative prescriptive (we have bypassed the influence 
of European Union regulations in our overview), Danish governments have been less directly 
involved in promoting or fighting trade unions. Even the Conservative-led coalition governments of 
the 1980s saw an interest in avoiding a serious attack on unions and the current government has 
followed a similar course, despite its initial ideological denunciations of collectivism. 
However, the Danish overview also indicates the importance of the unemployment insurance 
system (the Ghent system ) as a supportive mechanism. Originally, the Ghent system was not 
established to strengthen unions, but to alleviate financial pressure on the state (Lind 2004) but it 
became a major reason for substantial membership growth from the 1960s to the 1990s. Although 
the ‘Danish model’ and its high level of union density still exist, recent changes to the 
unemployment insurance system – as well as the threat of unemployment diminishing in the new 
millennium – has coincided with slowly declining union density rates. Danish unions – especially 
the white-collar and professional unions - are trying to establish other incentives to take up union 
membership but there are clearly some concerns about the ability to reverse the recent decline and 
maintain the high union density rates if ‘free-riding’ or ‘discount unionism’ become more prevalent.
The role of multi-employer bargaining in providing effectively membership benefits is illustrated by 
the New Zealand overview. New Zealand unions have never developed strong multi-employer 
bargaining across the economy as they could rely on the conciliation and arbitration system to 
provide employment gains even for small, weakly organised unions. With the demise of the 
conciliation and arbitration system and ideological attack on unionism in the 1990s, this prompted 
sharply falling union density rates. Even a more positive political and legislative situation in the new 
millennium has failed to increase pri vate sector multi-employer bargaining and surprisingly, unions 
have not developed an effective campaign. In that situation, union-specific benefits have been 
difficult to establish, with insufficient constraints on ‘free-riding’, employers being more generous in 
a tight labour market, and the government providing substantial increases in statutory minima.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The theoretical and empirical complexity surrounding union membership implies that there is no 
simple explanation of why unions have faced declining density levels in many countries and there 
is also no simple ‘cure’ for reversing declining density levels. In that light, our discussion has only 
scratch the surface of the current debates and it has focussed narrowly on trends and issues 
surrounding the tension between inclusive bargaining, perceived benefits of union membership and 
the negative impact of ‘free-riding’. The truncated overview of changes in Denmark and New 
Zealand also bypasses a number of fundamental changes in public policy, employment patterns, 
workplace relationships and, not least, prevailing attitudes  to union membership.
Our discussion indicates that recently the economic, social and institutional context has not been 
supportive of collective bargaining and unionism – both generally and in our two selected 
countries. It appears therefore, that the efficient delivery of benefits has become even more 
important and this probably demands a more extensive role of the state. While Dani sh and New 
Zealand unions can hardly avoid pursuing inclusive bargaining they are faced with a situation 
where the existence of perceived benefits has become more difficult to demonstrate. The Danish 
unions are clearly in a better position with the ingrained role of multi-employer bargaining, a 
tradition of unions driving improvements in employment standards, and a strong institutionalised 
presence at workplace level. New Zealand unions have yet to deliver on these ‘fundamental’ 
despite a more positive legislative context in the new millennium. 
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